WIDE Paper-List in 2010 The brighter side of risks in peer-to-peer barter relationships wide-paper-ideon-p2p-barter2010-00.txt WIDE Project: http://www.wide.ad.jp/ If you have any comments on WIDE documents, please contact to board@wide.ad.jp. Title: The brighter side of risks in peer-to-peer barter relationships Author(s): Kenji Saito, Eiichi Morino Date: 2010-10-01 % - 論文誌 @article{Saito:FutureGenerationComputerSystems201010, author = "Kenji Saito and Eiichi Morino", title = "The brighter side of risks in peer-to-peer barter relationships", journal = "Future Generation Computer Systems", volume = 26, number = 8, pages = "1300--1316", month = "October", year = 2010 } %Abstract % Complementary currencies in the context of P2P (peer-to-peer) networks can be powerful tools for promoting % exchanges and building sustainable relationships among selfish peers on the Internet. i-WAT [K. Saito, % Peer-to-peer money: Free currency over the Internet, in: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on % Human.Society@Internet, HSI 2003, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2713, Springer-Verlag, 2003] % (Internet WAT) has been proposed as such a currency based on the WAT System [watsystems.net, WATSystems home % page, hypertext document. Available electronically at http://www.watsystems.net/], a polycentric, real-life % complementary currency using WAT tickets as its media of exchange; participants spontaneously issue and circulate % the tickets, whose values are backed up by chains of trust, as needed. % % This article investigates the claim made in the past [K. Saito, E. Morino, J. Murai, Incentive-compatibility in a distributed % autonomous currency system, in: Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Agents and Peer-to-Peer % Computing, AP2PC 2005, 2005] that the design of i-WAT is incentive-compatible as to counteraction against moral % hazards. Such hazards are impeded in i-WAT because participants will have to take natural evasive actions to avoid % apparent risks posed by misbehaviors of others. % % This effect is measured for regular tickets, whose values remain constant over time, as well as for reduction [K. Saito, % E. Morino, J. Murai, Reduction over time to facilitate peer-to-peer barter relationships, IEICE Transactions on % Information and Systems E89-D (1)] and multiplication [K. Saito, E. Morino, J. Murai, Multiplication over time to facilitate % peer-to-peer barter relationships, in: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on P2P Data Management, % Security and Trust, PDMST ユ05, 2005] tickets, whose values are reduced or multiplied over time, respectively, by % simulating some small worlds of traders in the presence of whitewashers [M. Feldman, C. Papadimitriou, J. Chuang, I. % Stoica, Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems, in: Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on % Practice and Theory of Incentives in Networked Systems, 2004, pp. 228ミ236], a kind of free-riders who strategically % leave and re-join the system with new identities. The results are compared with simulations of the MCS (Mutual Credit % System), the category into which many existing currencies fall. %