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Skipping
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Skipping
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Network Working Group K. Fujiwara
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Network Working Group K. Fujiwara
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Internet-Draft JPRS
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Internet-Draft JPRS
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Intended status: Informational P. Vixie
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Intended status: Informational P. Vixie
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Expires: 30 March 2025 AWS Security
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Expires: 30 March 2025 AWS Security
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26 September 2024
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26 September 2024
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IP Fragmentation Avoidance in DNS over UDP
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IP Fragmentation Avoidance in DNS over UDP
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draft-ietf-dnsop-avoid-fragmentation-20
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draft-ietf-dnsop-avoid-fragmentation-21
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Abstract
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Abstract
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The widely deployed EDNS0 feature in the DNS enables a DNS receiver
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The widely deployed EDNS0 feature in the DNS enables a DNS receiver
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to indicate its received UDP message size capacity, which supports
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to indicate its received UDP message size capacity, which supports
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the sending of large UDP responses by a DNS server. Large DNS/UDP
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the sending of large UDP responses by a DNS server. Large DNS/UDP
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messages are more likely to be fragmented and IP fragmentation has
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messages are more likely to be fragmented and IP fragmentation has
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exposed weaknesses in application protocols. It is possible to avoid
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exposed weaknesses in application protocols. It is possible to avoid
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